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Within the general rubric of environmental policy
reform, the three papers in this session address the
current policy situation, the issues driving the pol-
icy reform movement, and how economics can con-
tribute to the debate and its outcome. The papers fit
together well to paint a picture of the evolution of
environmental policy and some of the issues and
challenges for economists associated with that evo-
lution. Although the authors note a number of is-
sues and challenges, there are other important
points which deserve attention. In addition, I find
myself challenging some of the points raised by the
authors. It is toward these points that I focus this
discussion paper.
Evolution of Environmental Policy
Carriker offers a thorough overview of the history
of environmental policy in the U.S. since passage
of the National Environmental Policy Act on Janu-
ary 1, 1970. To no one’s surprise, history provides
examples of radical improvements in the design
and implementation of environmental policy over
the last 25-plus years, as well as examples of sty-
mied efforts on the part of lawmakers, rtrlemakers,
and the regulated community. I wish Carriker had
provided more of his own insights into why specific
policies evolved as they did and the lessons to be
learned by this study of our environmental policy
history. We are perched at the edge of yet another
stage in the evolutionary process, and our delibera-
tions and decisions could benefit from a more thor-
ough understanding of past successes and failures.
In his brief appraisal of environmental policy,
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Carriker describes substantial improvements in
environmental quality, particularly air and water
quality. However, he also describes critical prob-
lems which remain: air quality problems in major
urban areas, nonpoint source water pollution, con-
taminated drinking water, and loss of biodiversity.
Given these and other remaining environmental
concerns, the ongoing policy debate seems to re-
volve around three critical questions: (a) How
much is the American public willing to pay to solve
these problems? (b) How are the costs of solving
these problems to be distributed? and (c) How can
the costs be minimized?
Much of the debate has focused on how federal
agencies have promulgated regulations in response
to laws passed by Congress. While there is little
question that substantial inefficiencies exist in the
regulatory process, and that, due to problems with
ambiguity, inconsistency, duplication, and delay,
costs to the regulated community are quite high, we
have to remember that the system has developed in
response to the set of constraints and incentives
within which it operates.
Might the costs to the regulated community be
less if the regulatory agency were in a position to
bear a larger burden of administrative and enforce-
ment costs? Have bureaucrats, in their own internal
cost/benefit analyses, found that environmental
goals identified by Congress can be achieved at
least cost to their limited budget by requiring com-
pliance with regulations which impose higher costs
on those who must comply? Our set of broad,
uniform environmental regulations—which treat
all geographical, hydrological, and social situations
equally—have undoubtedly imposed unnecessary
costs in some regions; the implications of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle D,
landfill regulations for western states is a case in
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the ability to fall back on arguments of fairness
when criticisms are levied, and the lower costs of
enforcing a single, uniform standard must have
been important factors when the Subtitle D regula-
tions were being drafted.
Attention to the actions of regulatory agencies
has, in some cases, diverted attention from the
kinds of laws being passed by Congress. It is clear
that over the last decade, Congress passed increas-
ingly detailed laws which provided less and less
flexibility for regulators. Consider the Clean Air
Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act. Both have, in the last few years, be-
come more and more explicit in their directions to
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in-
cluding specific lists of chemicals to be regulated
and specific mechanisms to be used by the regula-
tors. The attempt by various members of Congress
to lay the blame for costly regulation at the door of
EPA overlooks the role that Congress has played in
the evolution of our set of environmental regula-
tions.
Environmental Regulatory Reform Debate
Infanger cautions that “there are broader issues and
principles” involved in the policy debate than the
partisan wrangling we have seen over risk assess-
ments, unfunded mandates, and property rights. He
presents several in his paper; I would like to discuss
some others.
With respect to unfunded mandates, the im-
plications of increasing environmental federalism
must be discussed. Since increasing federal funding
to support implementation of environmental pro-
grams at the state and local levels is unlikely, let’s
assume that the alternative is a reduction in federal
oversight of environmental protection activities.
Decentralization of environmental policy means
more emphasis on localized priorities and budget
constraints, Broad, one-size-fits-all environmental
regulations will be replaced with programs which
reflect regional and local differences in physical
environment and associated environmental con-
cerns, Decentralization of environmental policy
also means a whole new set of issues, The econom-
ics profession may contribute by clarifying the
tradeoffs associated with decentralization—whe-
ther related to extra-regional impacts, environmen-
tal justice, interregional differences in preferences,
or economies or diseconomies associated with uni-
formity.
Infanger reports that Americans, by and large,
still perceive of themselves as environmentalists,
but feel that local, immediate problems are not suf-
ficient to justify the localized costs of current pro-
grams. Rather, they tend to focus their concerns on
more global, large-scale risks, suggesting a belief
that those risks are more deserving of attention by
federal regulators. In fact, in its own risk-ranking
exercise, the EPA placed such risks at the top of the
list. However, two precautionary notes are needed.
First, research has shown that individuals tend
to underestimate the risks of activities or events
with which they are unfamiliar, which are scien-
tifically complex, or which are distant in time or
space. Thus, should more concerted efforts to ad-
dress these larger, more global risks result in sig-
nificantly increased costs to individuals, they may
again question whether risks justify costs.
Second, the public has been asked to bear only
minimal costs associated with attempts to address
problems like global greenhouse gas emissions
and ozone depletion. Granted, costs of controls are
spread over a much larger portion of the populat-
ion. But I’m sure there are many among us who
grumbled a bit when we could no longer get freon
to recharge our own car air conditioners and were
forced, instead, to pay an automobile mechanic for
the freon, the labor, and the special equipment re-
quired to prevent discharges into the atmosphere.
Also, implementation of comprehensive pro-
grams to address such problems has been some-
where between weak and nonexistent. We know
that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions in the
U.S. have actually increased since the expressed
commitment to phase-out of CFCS. So we don’t yet
have a clear picture of the costs associated with ad-
dressing these global issues. Economists can play
an important role in helping to identify those costs
and their distribution, In addition, we may help to
define the tradeoffs faced in finally committing to
reducing global environmental risks.
I must raise one point of disagreement with In-
fanger. When noting the inefficiencies associated
with requiring a zero discharge of materials into air
and water, he equates this with requiring zero loss
of species. That is, the zero-loss goal of the En-132 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
dangered Species Act is equivalent to the zero-
discharge goal of the Clean Water Act. In fact, there
are significant differences between the two. We
know that air and water environments each have
some assimilative capacity; a certain amount of
waste material discharged into air or water can,
through dilution, degradation, or other processes,
be rendered harmless over a relatively short period
of time. Consider, for example, the oxygen sag
curve observed when dissolved oxygen in a stream
responds to an influx of organic wastes. Thus, the
case for allowing some level of discharge can be
made fairly strongly, so long as the assimilative ca-
pacity of the physical environment is not over-
whelmed.
The same is not true for protection of species.
Loss of a species is an irreversible event. Our
understanding of ecology tells us that species are
involved in intricate webs within specific eco-
systems; history has shown that loss of keystone
species, or even introduction of alien species, can
have significant negative impacts on the health
and sustainability of the system. Unfortunately, we
don’t know the long-term impacts of loss of biodi-
versity.
A simplistic analogy is the gradual removal of
bolts from an automobile. Which bolt is the one
which causes the automobile to stop functioning?
Similarly, you may recall a short story about a time
traveler who, during a trip to the past, accidentally
killed a butterfly-the repercussions of which were
staggering upon his return to the present. In reality,
loss of a single organism is unlikely to result in a
particularly catastrophic outcome. But can we say
the same about loss of a species?
Each of the issues addressed by Infanger—un-
funded mandates, risk assessments, and property
rights-is in fact a different angle on the overriding
concern that our environmental protection efforts
are too costly. The question I must ask is whether
the reaction by lawmakers and the public is turning
out to be an attempt to reduce the amount of envi-
ronmental protection afforded, rather than an at-
tempt to reduce the costs of achieving environmen-
tal goals. Consider, for example, the issue of risk
assessments. The call seems to be for an assessment
of whether we really need to spend the money for
environmental programs: Are the environmental
risks sufficient to justify the expenditures? But the
flip side of that question is whether we can find less
costly ways to minimize the risks.
Approaches to Environmental
Regulatory Reform
Shabman and Stephenson’s discussion of market-
based approaches for re@cing pollution is based,
in large, on the proposition that traditional com-
mand and control approaches have been too costly.
So, Infanger’s conclusion that we are somewhere
beyond the efficient quantity of environmental pro-
tection may be less than accurate if, in fact, the mar-
ginal cost curve reflects pollution control efforts
which could be made more cost effective.
Shabman and Stephenson do an excellent job
of delineating similarities and differences among
various members of the profession who consider
market-based incentive approaches superior to com-
mand and control approaches for controlling waste
discharges to the environment, However, those
members of the economics profession who have
adopted the label “ecological economists” or
“steady-state economists” likely would find it dif-
ficult to identify with any of the classifications that
Shabman and Stephenson have described,
In general, ecological economists assert that tra-
ditional economic approaches to addressing envi-
ronmental problems suffer from the fundamental
assumption that the environment is part of the hu-
man economy, rather than the other way around.
The environment is viewed as a resource or input
to production processes—a good to be valued by
and traded in a market. In fact, they would, argue,
the natural environment encompasses the human
economy. The economy is an open system within
the ecosphere, importing useful resources from and
exporting wastes to the environment. The eco-
sphere is a closed system (recall Boulding’s “space-
ship earth”). They would also argue that environ-
mental policy has, with rare exception, failed to
account for this fact and has, as a result, failed to
address the crucial question: How big can the econ-
omy become within the ecosystem before the eco-
system is overloaded and irreparably damaged or
destroyed?
This is the issue of scale—a central principle of
the ecological economics paradigm. Scale is simply
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total use of resources and discharge of wastes. The
scale issue arises because as the economy grows,
the volume of throughput increases—more produc-
tion means more throughput. The ecosphere has a
carrying capacity, and environmental policies de-
veloped without a formal decision on how big the
economy can get risk exceeding that carrying ca-
pacity.
In general, economists have tended to focus
largely on questions of allocation. The groups of
economists identified by Shabman and Stephenson
are examples. Although each comes at the question
in a slightly different way, all seek the optimal allo-
cation of environmental resources or rights to “use”
the environment, The market managers come clos-
est to the ecological economics perspective when,
in the first step, they seek to define environmental
goals. Nevertheless, if they “argue for reconsidera-
tion of environmental goals using economic con-
cepts of opportunity costs and marginal values in-
stead of stressing empirical measurements:’ as
Shabman and Stephenson assert, then they fail to
recognize that environmental goals require consid-
eration of scale—i.e., there are absolute limits to
the quantity of throughput which can be sustained.
The importance of opportunity costs in setting envi-
ronmental goals is not questioned, but such trade-
offs occur as societies consider alternative levels of
environmental quality within the global constraint
of carrying capacity.
In his article, “Allocation, Distribution, and
Scale: Towards an Economics That Is Efficient, Just,
and Sustainable,” Herrnan Daly uses the following
analogy to illustrate the problems which arise from
consideration of allocation in absence of scale.
In loading a boat we also have the problems of
allocation and scale—allocating or balancing the
load is one problem (a macroeconomic problem),
and not overloading a well-balanced boat is an-
other problem (a macroeconomic problem). . . .
Economists who are obsessed with allocation to
the exclusion of scale really deserve the environ-
mentalists’ criticism that they are busy rearrang-
ing deck chairs on the Titanic (pp. 191–92).
Daly suggests that tradable discharge permits is
one policy approach which has successfully ad-
dressed the issues of scale, distribution, and alloca-
tion, A limited number of rights to discharge are
created based on the absorption capacity of the re-
ceiving environment. Those rights are distributed,
to citizens or firms. Finally, individuals can reallo-
cate the permits through market channels in the in-
terest of efficiency. This process fixes scale (the
number of permits) but allows price to vary. Other
market-based approaches, he would argue, fail to
explicitly include scale as a critical design factor.
To follow the lead of Shabman and Stephenson,
a three-stage process in designing and implement-
ing environmental policy might be described by the
ecological economists. Step one would be to fix
scale—establish that level of economic activity
(throughput) which can be sustained ecologically.
The second step is to distribute rights-a socially
determined distribution. The third step is the choice
of environmental policy tool, whether it be a com-
mand and control mechanism or a market-based in-
centive approach. In the context of tradable dis-
charge permits, those individuals or groups
desiring a level of environmental quality greater
than the level afforded by the scale decision would
be able, through participating in the permit market,
to restrict discharges to a level lower than the abso-
lute maximum allowable.
Choice of an environmental policy tool maybe
complicated by the fact that different resource situ-
ations may require different approaches for protec-
tion. In their book, Natural Capital and Human
Economic Survival, Prugh et al. use importance and
irreversibility guidelines to delineate three types
of resource situations. First, resources which are
extremely important, and which cannot have their
ecological functions restored by human interven-
tion or natural processes, would require the firmest
constraints on use, such as outright prohibitions.
At the other extreme are resources of relatively
lesser importance and high reversibility. Use of this
group would be left to the choices of individuals
and markets, provided that all costs are carefully
accounted for.
At the center is that group of resources that lies
somewhere in between in terms of importance and
reversibility. They would not require the strict con-
trols of the first group, but would require more
protection than an open market situation would
allow—some mix of standards, quotas, etc. Prugh
et al. assert that this scheme acknowledges that
some decisions to protect or conserve environmen-134 Journal ofAgricultural and Applied Economics, July 1996
tal resources can be made primarily on the basis
of an understanding of their ecological importance,
apart from the results of any formal benefit/cost
analysis.
In summary, ecological economists offer a more
constrained approach to seeking out environmental
policies that are more efficient. While efficient allo-
cation is important, scale must be addressed first.
This is the critical difference between the ecologi-
cal economists and each of the groups described by
Shabman and Stephenson. A review of the ecologi-
cal economics literature provides further evidence
of differences in the professional understanding
of and support for market-based mechanisms for
achieving environmental goals.
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